一、主题：前向指导与可信货币政策

二、主讲人：董兵兵，澳门威斯人游戏网站官网讲师。2015年毕业于美国弗吉尼亚大学，获经济学博士。本科毕业于中央财经大学，2008年获得北京大学经济学硕士学位。主要专业方向为宏观经济学、金融学，尤其在资产定价和货币政策问题中有深入的研究。其研究成果在多个国际会议中宣讲，包括非线性动态和计量经济学会议、英国皇家经济学学会年会、美国东部经济学联会年会等。

三、时间：2015年11月11日（周三），12:30-13:30

四、地点：中央财经大学主楼913会议室

五、主持人：黄志刚，澳门威斯人游戏网站官网副教授、院长助理

摘要：The effectiveness of forward guidance depends crucially on the credibility of the central bank. Instead of assuming full commitment or full discretion of the central bank, this paper sheds light on the best credible forward guidance policy a central bank can offer by solving for the whole set of sustainable sequential equilibria (SSE) in a standard New Keynesian model with the occasionally binding constraint of a nominal interest rate of zero. The inflation bias resulting from eliminating price distortion under the best SSE is much smaller than the bias under full discretion. In the presence of the zero lower bound (ZLB), while the full commitment solution implies that forward guidance has a longer duration of the nominal rate at zero bound followed by a quick revert-to-normal path, the best SSE features low but non-zero rates, and even a prolonged period of higher inflation after the recession ends. To make forward guidance credible and as simulative as possible, the adjustment of policy rates, and in particular, the rise of policy rates, should be smooth and gradual. In other words, policy normalization does not mean non-accommodation. Ramsey equilibria are not generally implementable.