一、主题：Self-fulfilling Fire Sales, Bank Runs and Contagion: Implications for Bank Capital and Regulatory Transparency

二、主讲人：李昭，Universitat Pompeu Fabra博士（2015年12月毕业）。2006年获得武汉大学数理经济双学位，2009年获得Toulouse School经济学硕士。李昭博士的研究领域包括公司金融、金融管制以及宏观金融。

三、时间：2015年12月1日（周二），12:30-14:00

四、地点：中央财经大学主楼913会议室

五、主持人：王雅琦，澳门威斯人游戏网站官网讲师

摘要：In a global-games framework, we endogenize bank asset fire sales by emphasizing adverse selection: Asset prices collapse because in banking crises, assets sold by illiquid banks can hardly be distinguished from those by insolvent banks. Such adverse selection makes runs and fire sales self-fulfilling and mutually reinforcing; it also generates financial contagion when banks have common risk exposures. The theoretical framework delivers two new policy insights. (1) High capital holding can have unintended consequences on bank illiquidity and insolvency, because a run on a well-capitalized bank signals unusually high risk and reduces asset prices. (2) Regulatory transparency about banks’ common risk exposure can be suboptimal: While a favorable disclosure saves banks from illiquidity, acknowledging a crisis causes contagion due to the pessimistic belief updating of asset buyers’.