一、主题：Incentives, Information and Risk Taking: Evidence from Banking Lending in China

二、主讲人：苟琴，澳门威斯人游戏网站官网讲师。2014年毕业于北京大学，获经济学博士；2009年毕业于南开大学，获经济学学士。曾在美国纽约大学进行学术访问。主要研究领域包括国际金融、宏观经济、实证银行经济等。曾在China Economic Review，European Journal of Finance, China & World Economy，Asia Development Policy Review，《管理世界》、《世界经济》及《金融研究》等期刊发表多篇学术论文。曾获得澳大利亚中国经济学会年会（CESA）最佳论文、《金融研究》年度优秀论文、中国新兴经济体研究会优秀论文等学术奖项。

三、时间：2017年9月13日 （周三），12:30-13:30

四、地点：学院南路校区主教学楼910会议室

五、主持人：黄志刚，澳门威斯人游戏网站官网副教授

Abstract: Following China’s entrance into the WTO, Chinese banks faced more competition from foreign financial institutions and the regulation authority (CBRC) strengthened risk regulation and supervision in commercial banks. These changes in market competition and regulation requirement offered plausibly exogenous shocks to the banking sector, and trigged a series of performance incentive policies on loan officers for many Chinese banks in order to improve competition and loan quality. This study aims to estimate the impact of performance incentives on risk-taking and lending decisions by employing a unique branch level dataset. We first show that performance incentives significantly decrease non-performing ratio, while explicit and implicate incentives, money and non-money based incentives generate different effects. Second, performance incentives lead to larger average loan size and lower origination to small and medium enterprises and credit loan, indicating more use of hard information and less of soft information in lending decisions. Third, performance incentives lead to shorter average loan maturity, indicating weaker motivation in risk-taking. Finally, effects of incentives varies according to the competitiveness of loan officers' salary, the internal communication cost and contract enforcement power. Our results highlight whether and how incentives affect risk-taking and information use in bank lending.