Review of Accounting Studies, DEC 2018

竞争与自愿披露：来自银行业放松监管的证据

作者：Jeffrey J. Burks (Univ of Notre Dame),

Christine Cuny (New York Univ),

Joseph Gerakos (Dartmouth College),

Jo?o Granja (Univ of Chicago)

摘要：本文在州际银行及分支机构效率法案（IBBEA）对州际分支机构放宽限制的背景下，研究竞争的增加将如何影响从业者的自愿披露倾向。美国各州已在不同程度上实施了IBBEA多年，这使得我们可以确定竞争加剧对普通银行与私人银行在自愿披露决策上的影响。本文发现，竞争的加剧与公告发布的增加有关。一般而言，随着行业进入门槛的放宽，公司公告的语气会变得更为消极。然而，银行业的公告披露却随着准入门槛的降低而表现出递进式的积极语气。事实上，披露的增加与通过负面信息来减少行业进入的主导动机是一致的，其通过向投资者传达正面信息的激励来减轻行业准入门槛放宽所带来的影响。

关键词：自愿披露；竞争；银行业

Competition and voluntary disclosure: evidence from deregulation in the banking industry

Jeffrey J. Burks (Univ of Notre Dame), Christine Cuny (New York Univ), Joseph Gerakos (Dartmouth College), Jo?o Granja (Univ of Chicago)

ABSTRACT

We use the relaxation of interstate branching restrictions under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how increases in competition affect incumbents’ voluntary disclosure choices. States implemented the IBBEA over several years and to varying degrees, allowing us to identify the effect of increased competition on the voluntary disclosure decisions of both public and private banks. We find that increases in competition are associated with an increase in press releases. Overall, press releases become more negative in tone as entry barriers decrease. However, disclosures by public banks and by banks issuing equity become incrementally positive in tone when entry barriers decrease. Thus, the increase in disclosure is consistent with a dominant incentive to deter entry via negative information, which is mitigated by an incentive to communicate positive information to investors.

Keywords: Voluntary disclosure; Competition; Banking

原文链接：

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11142-018-9463-1

翻译：谭丰林