THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH. 29 JUNE 2018

关于固定成本和可变成本的非对称信息的采购

作者：RICK ANTLE （Yale School of Management）

PETER BOGETOFT（Copenhagen Business School）

摘要：本文研究当委托人从有关于固定和可变成本的私人信息的代理商处采购时，资源的最优配给和组织松弛问题。我们在具有持续类型的两期设置中研究该问题，并研究最优配给和松弛如何取决于生产随时间增加或减少。我们发现在具有持续类型的动态模型中的配给更加昂贵，因为在第1期中被排除的类型在第2期可能具有吸引力。配给成本随着生产的变化而增加。如果生产水平正在增加（减少），则委托人在第1期排除具有低可变（固定）成本的类型时会保持谨慎，因为这些类型在第2期会更有利可图。当生产随着时间的推移变得更加稳定时，可以在第1阶段进行更严格的配给，然后在第2阶段进行不太严格的配给（如果有的话）。

关键词：成本核算；固定和可变成本；生产合同；动态模型；资源配给；组织松弛；合同；成本函数；生产管理；管理会计

Procurement with Asymmetric Information About Fixed and Variable Costs

RICK ANTLE（Yale School of Management）, PETER BOGETOFT（Copenhagen Business School）

ABSTRACT

We investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about ?xed and variable costs. We study the problem in a two-period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend on whether production increases or decreases over time. We ?nd that rationing in a dynamic model with persistent types is extra costly, since the types that are eliminated in period 1 might have been attractive in period 2. The cost of rationing increases with the variability of production. If production levels are increasing (decreasing), the principal will be cautious when eliminating types with low variable (?xed) costs in period 1, since these types are particularly pro?table in period 2. When production is more stable over time, harsher rationing can be applied in period 1, followed by less harsh rationing, if any, in period 2.

Keywords: cost accounting; ?xed and variable costs; production contracting; dynamic model; resource rationing; organizational slack; contracting; cost functions; production management; managerial accounting

原文链接：https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-679X.12236

翻译：王霄霄