JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS, VOL 66, AUGUST 2018

内部董事会网络的影响：来自封闭式基金的证据

作者：Matthew E. Souther (University of Missouri)

摘要：最近的文献都强调了董事会的外部社会关系网络的重要性。本文使用封闭式基金样本说明了内部（董事会内）的联系也是股东价值的重要决定因素。本文发现具有共享教育、就业和家庭背景的董事会有较低的市场价值，较高的成本费用率，较高的董事薪酬水平以及更高的财务失实陈述可能性。这些董事会的董事流失率较低，新董事的任命更有可能与现任董事有关联。本文的结论是，内部董事会网络对公司的治理环境和整体监管质量会产生负面影响。

关键词：董事会网络; 社会关系; 董事薪酬; 董事会独立性; 封闭式基金; 披露

The Effects of Internal Board Networks: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Matthew E. Souther (University of Missouri)

ABSTRACT

Recent literature emphasizes the importance of a director's external network of social connections. I use a sample of closed-end funds to show that internal, within-board connections are also significant determinants of shareholder value. I find that boards with shared education, employment, and family backgrounds exhibit lower market values, higher expense ratios, higher director compensation levels, and an increased likelihood of financial misrepresentation. Director turnover is lower within these boards, and new director appointments are more likely to share connections with incumbent directors. I conclude that internal board networks negatively impact a firm's governance environment and overall monitoring quality.

Keywords: Boards of Director Networks；Social Ties；Director Compensation；Board Independence；Closed-End Funds；Disclosure

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410118300363#!

翻译：王秭越