THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH. 11 JUNE 2018

债务合同强制执行和保守主义：来自自然实验的证据相对目标设定与合作

作者:CYRUSAGHAMOLLA（Carlson School of Management）

NAN LI（University of Minnesota）

摘要：本研究提供的证据表明，在债务合同中使用保守会计取决于合同的强制执行。我们利用印度各州的强化债务合同强制执行的分批引入作为自然实验（其中债务合同的强制实施对于企业的会计选择和借贷行为是外生的），检验了债务合同执行对借款人损失确认及时性的影响。主要结果表明，强化债务合同的强制执行对借款公司损失确认的及时性具有显著的积极作用。我们发现，这种效应在总体借款增加以及具有较多有形资产的公司中最为显著，这与基于抵押品的解释一致。该研究还提供了由于贷款者要求而导致公司采用保守会计的因果证据。

关键词：债务合同；强制执行；损失确认及时性；保守主义

Debt Contract Enforcement and Conservatism: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

CYRUSAGHAMOLLA（Carlson School of Management）

NAN LI（University of Minnesota）

ABSTRACT

This study provides evidence that the use of conservative accounting in debt contracting depends on the enforceability of the contract. To test the effect of debt contract enforcement on borrowers’ timely loss recognition, we exploit the staggered introduction of enhanced debt contract enforcement in Indian states as a natural experiment, where the implementation of the enforcement is exogenous to the accounting choices and borrowing behavior of firms. The main results show that enhanced enforcement has a significant positive effect on the timeliness of loss recognition of borrowing firms. We find that the effect is strongest for firms that increased their overall borrowing and for firms with high levels of tangible assets, consistent with a collateral-based explanation. This study also provides causal evidence that firms adopt conservative accounting due to lenders’ demand.

Keywords: Debt Contracts; Enforcement; Timely Loss Recognition; Conservatism

原文链接：https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12238

翻译：王霄霄