Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Volume 53, Issue 5, October 2018

为什么日本CEO的薪酬与美国的如此不同？

作者：Luyao Pan (Sun Yat-sen University, China),

Xianming Zhou (Australian National University, Australia)

摘要：2010年3月，日本金融监管机构实施了该国首个关于披露指名个人的董事薪酬的立法。利用首次公开的日本高管数据，我们发现了日本首席执行官(CEO)的薪酬水平、结构和机制的直接证据，并对日本和美国进行了配对样本比较。最近的研究表明，自本世纪前十年中期以来CEO薪酬的国际差异已基本消失。与此相反，我们的研究结果显示，日本和美国的薪酬体系之间存在巨大差异，而且这很难用传统激励合同的差异来解释。

CEO Compensation in Japan: Why So Different from the United States?

Luyao Pan (Sun Yat-sen University, China), Xianming Zhou (Australian National University, Australia)

ABSTRACT

In Mar. 2010, Japan’s financial regulator implemented the country’s first legislation concerning the disclosure of director compensation for named individuals. Using the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, we document direct evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Japan and perform a matched-sample comparison between Japan and the United States. In contrast to the findings of recent studies showing that international differentials in CEO pay have largely disappeared since the mid-2000s, our results show strikingly large differences between the Japanese and American systems that are difficult to explain by differences in conventional incentive contracts.

原文链接：https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/ceo-compensation-in-japan-why-so-different-from-the-united-states/F01497560F0C5D70AFB5DF26672F16DD

翻译：阙江静