Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Volume 53, Issue 5, October 2018

对冲基金董事会和独立董事市场

作者：Christopher P. Clifford (University of Kentucky, USA),

Jesse A. Ellis (North Carolina State University, Canada),

William C. Gerken (University of Kentucky, USA)

摘要：我们提供了对对冲基金董事会及其董事的首次检验。绝大多数董事都是非常忙碌的独立董事。基金之所以寻找这些董事，是因为他们拥有更多声誉资本，这使他们成为独立可靠的监督者，他们的存在可以向投资者证明基金的质量。忙碌的独立董事更有可能被高质量基金聘用，并且他们的离任与投资者撤资关联。此外，拥有忙碌的独立董事的基金不太可能进行欺诈、滥用自由支配流动性限制或从事基于业绩的风险转移。

Hedge Fund Boards and the Market for Independent Directors

Christopher P. Clifford (University of Kentucky, USA), Jesse A. Ellis (North Carolina State University, Canada), William C. Gerken (University of Kentucky, USA)

ABSTRACT

We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent directors are more likely to be hired by high-quality funds, and their departure from the board is associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based risk shifting.

原文链接：https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/hedge-fund-boards-and-the-market-for-independent-directors/E05C6E640D28BD32D5057163CA8391B3

翻译：阙江静