JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS, VOL 66, AUGUST 2018

高管薪酬中的绩效归属条款

作者：J. Carr Bettis (Arizona State University)

John Bizjak（Texas Christian University）

Jeffrey L. Coles（University of Utah）

Swaminathan Kalpathy（Texas Christian University）

摘要：从1998年到2012年，对大型美国公司的高级管理人员使用绩效归属（p-v）股权奖励的比例从20％增加到70％。本文衡量p-v条款对基于股权薪酬的价值、delta、Vega的影响。本文发现公司披露与经济价值中报告的p-v奖励价值存在巨大差异。本文还发现，在ASC 718（2005）之后，基于股权的补助发放仍带有显著的补偿凸性（vega），并且与近期文献研究相反，本文的分析在实证上再次证实了补偿凸性（vega）与企业风险之间存在因果关系。

关键词：绩效归属条款；高管薪酬；股票奖励；期权奖励；时间归属；绩效评估；CEO薪酬；公司治理

Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive Compensation

J. Carr Bettis (Arizona State University)，John Bizjak（Texas Christian University），Jeffrey L. Coles（University of Utah），Swaminathan Kalpathy（Texas Christian University）

ABSTRACT

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards reported in company disclosures versus economic value. We also find that equity-based grants continue to convey significant compensation convexity (vega) after ASC 718 (2005) and that, counter to recent claims in the literature, our analysis empirically reaffirms the presence of a causal relation between compensation convexity (vega) and firm risk.

Keywords: Performance-Vesting Provisions；Executive Compensation；Stock Awards；Option Awards；Time-Vesting；Performance Measures；CEO Pay；Corporate Governance

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410118300338

翻译：王秭越