Pacific-Basin Finance Journal ? December2017 ? Volume 46

为什么企业采用股票期权并且谁受益？一个来自中国的自然实验

作者：Lin Jiang (School of Finance and Management, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom)

Gerhard Kling (School of Finance and Management, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom)

Hong Bo (School of Finance and Management, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom)

Ciaran Driver (School of Finance and Management, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom)

摘要：2006年，一项允许在中国进行股权补偿的监管改革，为调查股票期权的驱动因素和结果提供了一个自然的实验。其中存在两个独特的特征。首先，与美国相比，股票期权的采用出现得非常迅速，在美国，股票期权已经存在100多年，并且伴随着高峰期（20世纪90年代）和低谷期（20世纪50年代之前）。第二，国有企业发行股票期权是少见的。本研究以2004-2014年中国上市公司为研究对象，检验了两种竞争理论：最优契约理论和管理权理论。如果经理人拥有更多的股权，如果CEO还担任董事会主席，如果存在薪酬委员会，经理人更有可能接受股票期权。股权类型和公司特征也是股票期权授予的重要因素。在非国有企业，有证据表明，控股股东授予股票期权的频率较低，但如果他们这么做，他们似乎会诱使经理人暗箱操作串通。通过应用倾向评分匹配方法来解释自我选择偏差，本文并没有观察到股票期权发行后公司业绩或股东价值的任何改善。因此，管理权似乎是引入股票期权的主要驱动力。因此，管理问责制和更好的披露对于确保保股票期权提升创造价值必是不可少的。

关键词：股票期权，管理权，最优契约

Why do firms adopt stock options and who benefits? A natural experiment in China

Lin Jiang(School of Finance and Management, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom), Gerhard Kling(School of Finance and Management, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom), Hong Bo(School of Finance and Management, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom), Ciaran Driver(School of Finance and Management, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom)

ABSTRACT

A regulatory change in 2006, permitting equity compensations in China, offers a natural experiment to investigate drivers and outcomes of stock options. There are two unique features. First, adoption of stock options occurred rapidly compared to the US, where stock options have been around for more than 100 years with periods of high (1990s) and low (before 1950s) adoption. Second, stock options have been issued by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), an unusual aspect. This study analyzes all listed companies in China from 2004 to 2014, testing two competing theories: optimal contracting and managerial power. If managers own more equity, if the CEO also serves as board chairman and if compensation committees exist, managers are more likely to receive stock options. Ownership type and firm characteristics are also essential factors in granting stock options. In non-SOEs, evidence suggests that controlling shareholders award stock options less frequently but if they do they seem to induce managers to collude in tunneling. Applying a propensity score matching approach to account for an alleged self-selection bias, we do not observe any improvements in firm performance or shareholder value after stock options have been issued. Accordingly, managerial power seems to be the predominant driver for the introduction of stock options. Hence, managerial accountability and better disclosure are essential to ensure that stock options do contribute to value creation.

Keywords: Stock options; Managerial power; Optimal contracting

原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X17302354#!

翻译：施懿