JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, VOLUME56, JULY 2018

管理层薪酬与股票价格操纵

作者：JOSEF SCHROTH (Bank of Canada)

摘要：本文研究了最优管理薪酬在减少管理者报告目标不确定性中的作用。事实证明，自相矛盾的是，企业所有者允许具有较高倾向操纵短期股票价格的经理人来推动更高效率和更短期集中的股权激励。这些经理人也更加努力，操纵更多，但可能不会产生更高的公司利润。该模型与关于操纵与股权支付之间关系的现有实证研究结果一致，表明管理者操纵倾向的异质性可能是薪酬异质性的重要驱动因素。本文开发了新的可测试预测。

关键词：管理层薪酬合同，股票价格操纵，私人信息，股权激励的持续时间

Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation

JOSEF SCHROTH (Bank of Canada)

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the role of optimal managerial compensation in reducing uncertainty about manager reporting objectives. It is shown that, paradoxically, firm owners allow managers with higher propensity to manipulate the short‐term stock price to push for higher‐powered and more short‐term‐focused equity incentives. Such managers also work harder, and manipulate more, but may not generate higher firm profits. The model is consistent with existing empirical findings about the relationship between manipulation and equity pay, suggesting that heterogeneity in manager manipulation propensities may be an important driver of heterogeneity in pay. Novel testable predictions are developed.

Keywords: Managerial Compensation Contracts, Stock Price Manipulation, Private Information, Duration of Equity Incentives

原文链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12237

翻译：王秭越