Journal of Financial Economics·Volume 129, Issue 3·September 2018

股票发行和代理成本：世界各地股东批准的故事

作者：Clifford G. Holderness（European Corporate Governance Institute; Carroll School of Management, Boston College）

摘要：股票发行的强制性股东批准在不同国家和国家内部都不同。当股东批准发行时，平均公告回报是正的。当经理在没有股东批准的情况下发行股票时，回报率为负值且下降4％。投票越接近发行或所需数量越多，公开发行、配股和私募的回报就越高。当需要股东批准时，配股占主导地位。当经理人在没有股东批准的情况下发行股票时，公开发行占主导地位。这些结果表明，代理问题会影响股票发行，并对现有的逆向选择、市场时机和信号解释提出挑战。

关键词：股票发行，经验丰富的股票发行（SEO），代理成本，强制性股东投票，公司治理

Equity issuances and agency costs: The telling story of shareholder approval around the world

Clifford G. Holderness（European Corporate Governance Institute; Carroll School of Management, Boston College）

ABSTRACT

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies across and within countries. When shareholders approve issuances, average announcement returns are positive. When managers issue stock without shareholder approval, returns are negative and 4% lower. The closer the vote is to the issuance or the greater is the required plurality, the higher are the returns for public offers, rights offers, and private placements. When shareholder approval is required, rights offers predominate. When managers may issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate. These findings suggest that agency problems affect equity issuances and challenge existing adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations.

Keywords: Equity issuances, Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), Agency costs, Mandatory shareholder voting, Corporate governance

原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X18301545#!

翻译：何杉