JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, VOLUME 51，AUGUST 2018

反垄断并购审查费用和收购者游说

作者：Jana P. Fidrmuc (University of Warwick)

Peter Roosenboom (RSM Erasmus University)

Eden Quxian Zhang (Monash University)

摘要：本文详细记录了美国对并购的反垄断审查流程，我们发现监管成本和风险非常重要，并且通过收购者的游说来降低这些风险可能会使股东受益。我们的结果显示，反垄断审查的不利结果导致收购方公司价值下降2.8％。此外，我们表明，在交易公告之前进行游说可能带来更有利的审查结果。最后，更高的预先公告游说受到股东的重视，尤其是在横向交易和市场集中度预期变化较大的交易中，这些因素具有较高的反托拉斯问题。然而，游说的这种积极价值效应仅适用于具有强大公司治理的公司。我们的结果强调了在面临监管成本和风险时政治关联和游说对企业投资的作用。

关键词：兼并与收购，反垄断，企业游说

Antitrust Merger Review Costs and Acquirer Lobbying

Jana P. Fidrmuc (University of Warwick), Peter Roosenboom (RSM Erasmus University), Eden Quxian Zhang (Monash University)

ABSTRACT

Documenting the US antitrust review process for M&As in rich detail, we unveil that regulatory costs and risks are significant and that mitigating these risks via lobbying by acquirers may benefit shareholders. Our results show that an adverse antitrust review outcome leads to a decline of 2.8% in acquirer firm value. Further, we show that lobbying before deal announcements is associated with more favorable review outcomes. Finally, higher pre-announcement lobbying is valued by shareholders, especially in horizontal deals and deals with a larger expected change in market concentration, which have higher antitrust concerns. However, this positive value effect of lobbying applies only in firms with strong corporate governance. Our results highlight the role of political connections and lobbying for corporate investments when facing regulatory costs and risks.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions，Antitrust，Corporate Lobbying

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119917307356#!

翻译：王秭越