Financial Management · 14 June 2018

强制要约规则能给目标股东增加价值吗？

作者：Sapnoti K.Eswar(Lindner College of Business, University of Cincinnati)

摘要：本文研究了强制要约规则——即授予所有股东以平等的条件参与收购交易的规则——是否影响目标公告收益。本文使用了双重差分的方法，并在15个欧洲国家交错采用该规则。研究发现规则改变会导致更高的目标回报率。在全面交易中，收购方更优的会计准则和股东保护规范导致更高的目标收益。在多数交易中，拥有较低的会计标准的收购方进行较大的价值转移时，导致的目标收益率更高。本文发现收购方支付过高收购价格的证据不充分。

Does the Mandatory Bid Rule Add Value to Target Shareholders?

Sapnoti K.Eswar(Lindner College of Business, University of Cincinnati)

ABSTRACT

I investigate whether implementation of the mandatory bid rule – the rule that grants all shareholders the right to participate in a takeover transaction at equal terms – affects target announcement returns. I use a difference‐in‐differences approach and the staggered adoption of the rule across 15 European countries. I find that the rule change leads to higher target returns. In full transactions, better accounting standards and share‐holder protection norms of the acquirer leads to higher target returns. In majority transactions, greater value transfer from acquirers with weak accounting standards leads to higher target returns. I find weak evidence of overpayment by acquirers.

原文链接：https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12239

翻译：施懿