JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, VOLUME 51，AUGUST 2018

战略投票和内部人员所有权

作者：Blair B. Marquardt (University of North Texas)

Brett W. Myers (Texas Tech University)

Xu Niu (Stockton University)

摘要：当管理者在他们所管理的公司拥有所有权时，管理者的激励措施与股东的激励措施可以更好地保持一致。然而，管理者所有权会使管理者更顺利地通过股东决议从而加剧代理问题。我们概述了一个战略股东投票模式，允许外部股东减轻内部人士的影响。与我们的模型相一致，实证数据支持外部股东的战略投票，且当管理发起的提案有争议或复杂时，投票结束时或其他代理风险更大时，战略投票效果更为明显。

关键词：股东投票，战略投票，内部人员所有权，管理提案

Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership

Blair B. Marquardt (University of North Texas), Brett W. Myers (Texas Tech University), Xu Niu (Stockton University)

ABSTRACT

Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders. Consistent with our model, we find empirical support for strategic voting by outside shareholders and that strategic voting is more apparent when management-sponsored proposals are controversial or complex, when votes are close, or when other agency risks are greater.

Keywords: Shareholder Voting, Strategic Voting, Insider Ownership, Management Proposals

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119917303875#!

翻译：王秭越