Financial Management · 12 June 2018

公司治理与财务同业效应

作者：Douglas Fairhurst(Washington State University, Pullman, WA),

Yoonsoo Nam(Washington State University, Pullman, WA)

摘要：越来越多的证据表明，公司管理者部分地通过模仿同业公司的财务政策选择财务政策。本篇论文认为，对于在较弱的公司外部治理环境下运营的企业，同业效应在资本结构选择的应用是独特的。此外，横截面测试中表明，这一结果能够用“平静的生活”假设予以解释——管理者也许可以同时避免优化财务政策所需要付出的努力以及市场参与者的审查。我们结果也揭示了，模仿其他公司的杠杆率表明公司对于盈利能力冲击的敏感度较低。最后，模仿行为与更高的财务成本和更低的未来盈利相关，尤其是在它导致了较高杠杆率的情况下。

Corporate Governance and Financial Peer Effects

Douglas Fairhurst(Washington State University, Pullman, WA), Yoonsoo Nam(Washington State University, Pullman, WA)

ABSTRACT

Growing evidence suggests that managers select financial policies partially by mimicking the financial policies of peer firms. This paper documents that the use of these peer effects in capital structure choice is unique to firms operating in a weak external corporate governance environment. Further, cross‐sectional tests suggest that this finding is best explained by a quiet life hypothesis in which managers may be able to avoid both the effort required to optimize financial policies and the scrutiny of market participants. We also show that leverage ratios of mimicking firms display less sensitivity to a shock to profitability. Finally, mimicking correlates to higher financing costs and lower future profitability, especially if it results in high leverage ratios.

原文链接：https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12240

翻译：施懿