The Accounting Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, May 2018,

中国封闭的金字塔式管理劳动力市场和股票价格崩盘风险

作者：Donghua Chen (Nanjing University, China), Jeong-Bon Kim (City University of Hong Kong, China), Oliver Zhen Li (National University of Singapore, Singapore), Shangkun Liang (Central University of Finance and Economics,China)

摘要：中国国有企业的经理们在一个封闭的金字塔式的管理劳动力市场工作。如果他们选择留在这个体系中，他们就享受着不可转让的利益。他们在劳动力市场中的等级(他们的政治等级)越高，他们的外部就业机会就越少。由于职业和财富的关系，他们在管理公司时是谨慎的和风险规避的。我们研究了管理者的政治等级对公司股票价格崩盘风险的影响，并发现了一个负的关联。这种关联主要存在于拥有年轻的经理和任期较短的经理的公司中。此外，这种影响仅仅存在于市场力量薄弱的区域，存在于没有外国投资者、没有政治联系的公司，以及存在于没有地方政府领导人或管理人员的政治晋升的时期。我们得出的结论是，政治等级系统降低了股票价格崩盘风险。

China's Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk

Donghua Chen (Nanjing University, China), Jeong-Bon Kim (City University of Hong Kong, China), Oliver Zhen Li (National University of Singapore, Singapore), Shangkun Liang (Central University of Finance and Economics, China)

ABSTRACT

Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk.

原文链接：http://www.aaajournals.org/doi/abs/10.2308/accr-51867

翻译：阙江静