JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, VOLUME 50，JUNE 2018

多个大股东和企业投资：来自中国的证据

作者：Fuxiu Jiang (Renmin University of China),

Wenjing Cai (Renmin University of China)

Xue Wang (University of International Business and Economics)

Bing Zhu (Central University of Finance and Economics)

摘要：本文研究了多个大股东（以下简称MLS）在公司投资决策中的治理作用。以上海或深圳交易所上市的1640家中国公司为样本，我们将拥有MLS的公司的投资效率与拥有单个大股东的公司的投资效率进行比较，并发现MLS的存在和权力大小与提高投资效率相关。在解决内生性和样本选择问题之后，结果是稳健的。进一步的检验表明MLS主要通过“语音”来施加治理。MLS倾向于降低潜在的过度投资并增加未来的投资表现。MLS对投资效率的影响并不随着企业获得资源而变化，而且在管理更强，信息不对称程度更低的企业中更不突出。我们的结果意味着MLS起到治理的作用，并且缓解了公司投资效率中的公司代理成本和信息不对称。

关键词：多个大股东，投资，监控

Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Investment: Evidence from China

Fuxiu Jiang (Renmin University of China), Wenjing Cai (Renmin University of China), Xue Wang (University of International Business and Economics), Bing Zhu (Central University of Finance and Economics)

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the governance role of multiple large shareholders (MLS hereafter) in firms' investment decisions. Using a sample of 1640 Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock markets, we compare the investment efficiency of firms having MLS with that of firms having a single large shareholder and find that the presence and power of MLS are associated with significantly higher investment efficiency. The results are robust after we address endogeneity and sample selection concerns. Further tests show that MLS exert governance mainly through “voice.” MLS tend to lower potential overinvestment and increase future investment performance. The impact of MLS on investment efficiency does not vary with a firm's access to resources and is less prominent in firms with stronger governance and less information asymmetry. Our results imply that MLS play a governance role and alleviate a firm's agency costs and information asymmetry manifested in a firm's investment efficiency.

Keywords: Multiple Large Shareholders, Investment, Monitoring

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119917303772#!

翻译：王秭越