JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, MARCH 2018
信用违约互换与管理者自愿披露
作者：JAE B.KIM (Lehigh University)
PERVIN SHROFF (University of Minnesota)
DUSHYANTKUMAR VYAS (University of Toronto)
REGINA WITTENBERG-MOERMAN(University of Southern California)
摘要：本文研究了交易信用违约互换（CDS）的可用性如何影响企业的自愿披露选择。CDS使贷款人能够对冲他们的信用风险敞口，削弱他们监督借款人的积极性。我们预测，贷款人监督的减少反过来会导致股东加大监督力度，并要求增加管理者的自愿披露。与这一预期一致，我们发现当公司涉及CDS时，管理人员更有可能发布盈利预测且预测更加频繁。我们进一步发现，CDS可用性在以下情况对公司信息披露的影响更大：（1）贷款人具有较高的能力和倾向使用CDS对冲信用风险；（2）贷款机构监督激励和监督力度较弱。与贷款人监督减少导致股东对公开信息披露需求增加相一致，我们发现CDS对于机构所有权更高和公司治理更强的公司自愿披露的影响更大。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，拥有CDS合约交易的公司加强了自愿披露，以抵消因CDS产生的贷方减少监督的影响。
关键词： CDS市场，信用违约互换，CDS交易启动，银行监督，私人贷方监督，自愿披露，收益预测，管理预测
Credit Default Swaps and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure
JAE B.KIM (Lehigh University), PERVIN SHROFF (University of Minnesota), DUSHYANTKUMAR VYAS (University of Toronto), REGINA WITTENBERG-MOERMAN(University of Southern California)
ABSTRACT
We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders. Keywords: CDS Market, Credit Default Swaps, CDS Trading Initiation, Bank Monitoring, Private Lender Monitoring, Voluntary Disclosures, Earnings Forecasts, Management Forecasts
原文链接：
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1475-679X.12194
翻译：王秭越
