The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 5, 1 May 2018, Pages 1966–2003

共同基金透明度和企业短视

作者：Vikas Agarwal(J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University), Rahul Vashishtha(Fuqua School of Business, Duke University), Mohan Venkatachalam(Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)

摘要：机构基金经理在短期内实现利润的压力常常被归咎于企业短视。理论研究表明，基金经理的短期关注源于他们对事业的关心，而更高的基金透明度会放大这些担忧。利用能够提高基金经理投资组合选择透明度的监管冲击的DID模型，我们考察了增加透明度是否会鼓励短视的公司投资行为。我们发现，在监管冲击之后，企业创新下降。此外，来自共同基金交易行为的证据证实，基金经理短期关注的增加推动了这些结果。

Mutual Fund Transparency and Corporate Myopia

Vikas Agarwal（J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University）；Rahul Vashishtha（Fuqua School of Business, Duke University）；Mohan Venkatachalam（Fuqua School of Business, Duke University）

ABSTRACT

Pressure from institutional money managers to generate profits in the short run is often blamed for corporate myopia. Theoretical research suggests that money managers’ short-term focus stems from their career concerns and greater fund transparency can amplify these concerns. Using a difference-in-differences design around a regulatory shock that increased the transparency of fund managers’ portfolio choices, we examine whether increased transparency encourages myopic corporate investment behavior. We find that corporate innovation declines following the regulatory shock. Moreover, evidence from mutual fund trading behavior corroborates that the increased short-term focus of money managers drives the results.

原文链接：https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/31/5/1966/4596566?redirectedFrom=fulltext

翻译：黄涛