JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE，VOL46 ,MARCH 2018

银行关系的数量与借款成本：信息不对称的作用

作者：Diana Bonfim(Banco de Portugal and Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics)

Qinglei Dai(Nova School of Business and Economics)

Francesco Franco(Nova School of Business and Economics)

摘要：在一个几乎涵盖所有葡萄牙银行贷款的独特数据集中，我们发现当一家公司从另一家银行借款时，该公司的银行贷款利率平均下降14至28个基点。这一结果适用于小公司，但不适用于大公司。我们检验了三个与这一发现一致的理论。更多的银行关系可以：（1）增加企业的议价能力;（2）降低银行的监督成本;（3）减少借款人和贷款人之间的不对称信息。我们的实证结果既不符合公司议价能力增加的观点，也不支持银行监督成本下降的观点，但与信息不对称在小企业融资中的重要经济作用观点是一致的。

关键词：银行，关系银行，借款成本

The Number of Bank Relationships and Borrowing Costs: The Role of Information Asymmetries

Diana Bonfim (Banco de Portugal and Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics), Qinglei Dai (Nova School of Business and Economics), Francesco Franco (Nova School of Business and Economics)

ABSTRACT

In a unique dataset that covers virtually all bank loans granted in Portugal, we find that when a firm borrows from one additional bank, the interest rate on bank loans for this firm decreases on average by 14 to 28 basis points. The result holds for small firms but not for larger firms. We test three theories that are consistent with this finding. More banks relationships may: (1) increase firms’ bargaining power, (2) decrease banks’ monitoring costs, (3) reduce asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. We show that our empirical findings are neither consistent with the increase in firm bargaining power nor supportive of the decrease in banks’ monitoring costs. Our results are consistent with an important economic role of asymmetric information in the funding of small firms.

Keywords: Banks, Relationship Banking, Borrowing Costs

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539817301238#!

翻译：王秭越