JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, VOLUME 50，JUNE 2018

管理劳动力市场细分：当地市场密度如何影响激励和绩效

作者：Hong Zhao (NEOMA Business School)

摘要：本文研究了管理劳动力市场的密度如何影响管理激励和企业绩效。本文发现美国的管理市场是局部分割而非全国整合的，本地市场的劳动力密度为管理人员提供了非薪酬激励。实证结果显示，在更密集的劳动力市场中，高管面临更强的以业绩为导向的解雇威胁以及更好的外部机会。这些激励措施可以在更密集的市场中提高公司业绩，特别是当管理人员的职业年限更长时。利用各州非竞争条款执行力度的差别，本文发现市场密度对激励调整和公司业绩的积极影响在高管们更容易流动的市场中更强。这一证据进一步支持了当地劳动力市场密度可以作为外部激励机制的论点。

关键词：管理劳动力市场，地理分割，当地市场密度，非薪酬激励，公司业绩

Executive Labor Market Segmentation: How Local Market Density Affects Incentives and Performance

Hong Zhao (NEOMA Business School)

ABSTRACT

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive alignment mechanism.

Keywords: Executive Labor Market, Geographic Segmentation, Local Market Density, Non-compensation Incentive, Firm Performance

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119917304509#!

翻译：王秭越