JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, VOLUME 49，APRIL 2018

私人控制权收益和银行贷款合同

作者：Chih-Yung Lin(Yuan Ze University)

Wei-Che Tsai(National Sun Yat-sen University)

Iftekhar Hasan(Fordham University)

Le Quoc Tuan(Banking Academy of Vietnam)

摘要：本文研究管理层和大股东的控制权收益是否会影响企业的融资成本。有证据表明，贷款银行会大幅度提高贷款利差和费用，缩短贷款期限，缩小贷款规模，严格制定合约，并对私人控制权更大的公司要求更多抵押品。研究结果表明，这种现象在公司治理质量薄弱的公司严重，这支持了代理成本的观点。这样的证据也意味着银行在作出贷款决定时将更高的私人控制权收益视为一种代理问题。

关键词：私人控制权益，代理问题，银行贷款利差，非价格条款，公司治理

Private Benefits of Control and Bank Loan Contracts

Chih-Yung Lin(Yuan Ze University), Wei-Che Tsai(National Sun Yat-sen University), Iftekhar Hasan(Fordham University), Le Quoc Tuan(Banking Academy of Vietnam)

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates whether or not private benefits of control by managers and large shareholders influence the financing cost of firms. Evidence shows that lending banks demand a significantly higher loan spread, higher fees, shorter loan maturity, smaller loan size, stricter covenants, and greater collateral on firms with greater private benefits of control. Results are stronger for firms with weak corporate governance quality, supporting the agency cost viewpoint. Such evidence implies that banks consider higher private benefits of control as a type of agency problem when they make lending decisions.

Keywords: Private Benefits of Control, Agency Problem, Bank Loan Spread, Non-price Terms, Corporate Governance

原文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092911991730528X

翻译：王秭越