Journal of Financial Economics·Volume 127, Issue 1·January 2018

非评级收入与利益冲突

作者：Ramin P.Baghai（Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Finance）

Bo Becker（Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Finance）

摘要：评级机构出具投资者使用的评级，却从发行人处获得大部分收入，这导致利益冲突。我们使用在印度的非评级服务和相关支付的独特数据集，来测试这种冲突是否影响评级质量。评级机构给那些支付非评级服务的发行人更高的评级（相对于那些没有被雇佣提供这类服务的评级机构）。这些发行人也有较高的违约率。这两种效应都随支付的金额增加。这些结果表明，尽管违约风险较高，但那些聘请评级机构提供非评级服务的发行人可获得较高的评级。

关键词：信用评级，代理问题，发行人支付

Non-rating revenue and conflicts of interest

Ramin P.Baghai（Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Finance）

Bo Becker（Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Finance）

ABSTRACT

Rating agencies produce ratings used by investors, but obtain most of their revenue from issuers, leading to a conflict of interest. We employ a unique data set on the use of non-rating services, and the associated payments, in India, to test if this conflict affects ratings quality. Agencies rate issuers that pay them for non-rating services higher (than agencies not hired for such services). Such issuers also have higher default rates. Both effects are increasing in the amount paid. These results suggest that issuers which hire agencies for non-rating services receive higher ratings despite having higher default risk.

Keywords：Credit ratings, Agency problems, Issuer-pays

原文链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X17302544#!

翻译：何杉