The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 2, 1 February 2018

共同基金经理的投资技能是否得到支付

作者：M Ibert(Stockholm School of Economics)

R Kaniel(University of Rochester)

S Van Nieuwerburgh(New York University Stern School of Business)

R Vestman(Stockholm University)

摘要：共同基金经理的薪酬对于理解资产委托中的代理摩擦至关重要。我们在瑞典共同基金经理的薪酬上收集了一个独特的注册数据集。我们发现薪酬与收入之间存在一种凹的关系，这与投资者如何赔偿基金公司(公司)形成了鲜明的对比。我们还发现，即使考虑到业绩对收入的间接影响，薪酬对业绩的敏感度也出奇地低。公司层面的固定效应、收入和利润为薪酬增加了大量的解释力。

Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Investment Skill?

M Ibert(Stockholm School of Economics)；R Kaniel(University of Rochester)；S Van Nieuwerburgh(New York University Stern School of Business)；R Vestman(Stockholm University)

ABSTRACT

Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level fixed effects, revenues, and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation.

原文链接：https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/31/2/715/4110801?redirectedFrom=fulltext

翻译：黄涛