Review of Accounting Studies ·Volume 22, Issue 3 · SEP 2017

股东激进主义和自愿披露

作者：Thomas Bourveau (HKUST)

Jordan Schoenfeld (University of Utah)

摘要：我们检验了股东激进主义和自愿披露之间的关系。自愿披露的一个重要结果是减少了在资本市场上逆向选择。激进投资者的投资目标是那些被错误定价而导致价值低估的公司，他们认为减少逆向选择将会使投资变得无利可图。与这个观点相一致，我们发现管理人员在企业容易受到激进投资者的攻击时会更频繁地发布盈利和销售预测，而这些额外的披露减少了该公司成为激进投资者目标的可能性。这些额外的披露也带来了正向的价格反应，包含更精确的指导作用，并超出了市场的普遍预期。研究结果表明管理者使用自愿披露来取代激进主义者对他们公司的可能影响，并且激进主义者也更倾向于针对信息相对不透明的公司。

关键词：公司披露，公司治理，投资者关系，股东激进主义

Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

Thomas Bourveau (HKUST), Jordan Schoenfeld (University of Utah)

ABSTRACT

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist’s target. These additional disclosures also prompt a positive price reaction, contain more precise guidance, and exceed prevailing market expectations. These findings imply that managers use voluntary disclosure to preempt activism at their firm, and that activists prefer to target relatively opaque firms.

Keywords: Corporate disclosure, Corporate governance, Investor relations, Shareholder activism

原文链接：

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11142-017-9408-0

翻译：张展