JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, VOL 55, ISSUE 5, NOVEMBER 2017

现金流量权和投票权的分离、不透明度与股价崩盘风险：国际证据

作者：HYUN A,HONG(University of California)

JEONG-BON KIM(City University of Hong Kong and University of Waterloo)

MICHAEL WELKER(Queen’s University)

摘要：本文研究了现金流量权（所有权）与投票权（控制权）或者简而言之所有权与控制权的分离是否以及如何影响股票收益分布中出现极端负异常值的可能性，即所谓的股价暴跌风险。我们用1995 - 2007年间来自全球20个国家的具有双层股权结构的公司的综合面板数据集来进行研究。我们预测并发现，两权分离程度大的不透明企业比两权分离程度小的不透明公司更容易发生股价崩盘。另外，我们发现，对于外部监督更有效的公司以及具有更大增长机会的公司，两权分离程度和崩盘风险之间的正相关关系不太明显。本文的结果与Jin和Myers的理论大体一致，即代理成本与不透明度加剧了股价崩盘风险。

关键词：所有权控制权分离度，股价崩盘风险，信息不透明，国际财务报告准则

Divergence of Cash Flow and Voting Rights, Opacity, and Stock Price Crash Risk: International Evidence

HYUN A,HONG(University of California), JEONG-BON KIM(City University of Hong Kong and University of Waterloo), MICHAEL WELKER(Queen’s University)

ABSTRACT

This study investigates whether and how the deviation of cash flow rights (ownership) from voting rights (control), or simply the ownership-control wedge, influences the likelihood that extreme negative outliers occur in stock return distributions, which we refer to as stock price crash risk. We do so using a comprehensive panel data set of firms with a dual-class share structure from 20 countries around the world for the period of 1995–2007. We predict and find that opaque firms with a large wedge are more crash prone than opaque firms with a small wedge. In addition, we predict and find that the positive relation between the wedge and crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more effective external monitoring and for firms with greater growth opportunities. The results of this study are broadly consistent with Jin and Myers’s theory that agency costs, combined with opacity, exacerbate stock price crash risk.

Keywords: Ownership-control Wedge, Stock Price Crash Risk, Information Opacity, IFRS

原文链接：

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-679X.12185/full

翻译：王秭越