Journal of Financial Markets·Volume 35·September 2017·Pages 65-83

团队协作与悄无声息的干预：机构投资者对高管薪酬政策的影响

作者：Mieszko Mazur（Department of Finance, IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS)）

Galla Salganik-Shoshan（Finance Division, Department of Business Administration

Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management）

摘要：在本文中，我们研究了机构投资者是否介入企业以影响其激励机制。我们使用基于机构投资者之间地理位置的指标作为其战略互动强度和合理干预措施的代理变量。我们发现，当投资者在地理位置上互相接近时，企业倾向于采用更多地依赖于绩效机制、对管理层的努力更具有激励作用，以及更能够激励管理层做出具有风险和正净现值的投资选择的高管薪酬合同。 我们还发现，机构之间的地理距离是高管薪酬差异的重要决定因素。

关键词：机构投资者，高管薪酬，战略互动，高管薪酬差异，地理位置

Teaming up and quiet intervention: The impact of institutional investors on executive compensation policies

Mieszko Mazur（Department of Finance, IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS)）

Galla Salganik-Shoshan（Finance Division, Department of Business Administration, Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management）

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we investigate whether institutional investors intervene in firms in order to impact their incentive systems. We use metrics based on geographic distance between institutional investors as proxies for the intensity of their strategic interactions and plausible interventions. We find that when investors are geographically proximate to one another, firms tend to adopt executive compensation contracts that exhibit more performance-based mechanisms, higher incentives to expend managerial effort, and higher incentives to make risky and positive NPV policy choices. We also find that geographic distance between institutions is a significant determinant of the executive pay differentials.

Keywords：Institutional investors, Executive compensation, Strategic interactions, Executive pay disparity, Geography

原文链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1386418116300301#!

翻译：何杉