JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, VOL 55, ISSUE 4, SEPTEMBER 2017

CEO内部债务激励与公司避税

作者：Sabrina Chi（Texas Tech University）

Shawn X. Huang（Arizona State University）

Juan Manuel Sanchez（Texas Tech University）

摘要:本文研究了CEO内部持有债券（养老金和递延薪酬）与公司避税之间的关系。因为内部持有的债券大多是这个公司无抵押、无外部融资的短期负债，CEO们面临着与外部债权人相同的风险。因此，Jensen和Meckling(1976)认为内部持有债券会给CEO的风险偏好带来负面影响。考虑到公司避税地很可能会导致未来现金流的剧烈波动，我们预计内部持有的债务将抑制首席执行官从事避税交易的行为。与预测相一致，我们记录了CEO在债务持有和避税之间的负相关性。另外的分析表明，在高违约风险和流动性威胁（养老金投资组合中的套现期权）存在的情况下，内部债务对避税的影响更显著（或更不显著）。总的来说，我们的研究结果强调了研究CEO似债补偿对公司税收政策的影响的重要性。

关键词：内部债券，延期补偿，激励，高管薪酬，避税，避税场所

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

Sabrina Chi（Texas Tech University）, Shawn X. Huang（Arizona State University）, Juan Manuel Sanchez（Texas Tech University）

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk-appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash-out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt-like compensation for corporate tax policies.

Keywords: Inside Debt, Deferred Compensation, Incentives, Executive Compensation, Tax Sheltering, Tax Shelters

原文链接：http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-679X.12169/full

翻译：王秭越