Review of Accounting Studies ·VOL22,NO. 3· 2017.09

监管机构的监督作用：SEC评论信在IPO过程中的证据

作者：Bing Li (City University of Hong Kong), Zhenbin Liu (Hong Kong Baptist University)

摘要：本研究探讨监管监督如何影响首次公开发行（IPO）的价格形成。我们通过审查证券交易委员会在最初上市的过程中发表的评论信的影响，提供了美国证券交易委员会（SEC）监督作用的证据。我们发现，IPO发行人如果收到评论信，会降低报价。当IPO公司与证券交易委员会有更多的联系时，从IPO申请日期到最后发行日的价格下降会更大。对于具有更大炒作诱因的新股发行人，SEC的评论信对定价的影响更加明显。此外，我们发现，收到更多评论信的IPO公司与收到较少评论信的IPO公司相比，在发行日后，有着相似的抑价和长期表现。

关键词：SEC评论信，披露，信息不对称，炒作，价格形成

The oversight role of regulators: evidence from SEC comment letters in the IPO process

Bing Li (City University of Hong Kong), Zhenbin Liu (Hong Kong Baptist University)

ABSTRACT

This study investigates how regulatory oversight affects the price formation of initial public offerings (IPOs). We provide evidence on the oversight role of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by examining the effects of comment letters issued by the SEC in the process through which companies are initially listed. We find that IPO issuers reduce their offer price if they receive comment letters. The reduction in price from the IPO filing date to the final issue date is greater when the IPO firm has more correspondence with the SEC. The pricing impact of SEC comment letters is more pronounced for IPO issuers with greater hyping incentives. Moreover, we find that IPO firms that receive more comment letters have similar levels of underpricing and outperform over the long run after the issue date, compared with IPOs with fewer comment letters.

Keywords: SEC comment letters; Disclosure; Information asymmetry; Hyping; Price formation

原文链接：

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11142-017-9406-2

翻译：黄涛