Financial Management (Wiley-Blackwell). Volume 42, Volume 46, Issue 1 Spring 2017 Pages 241–274

多家大股东对债务来源选择的影响

作者：Sabri Boubaker (Champagne School of Management (Groupe ESC Troyes)), Wael Rouatbi (Montpellier Business School - Montpellier Research in Management in Montpellier, France.), Walid Saffar (School of Accounting and Finance at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong)

摘要：这篇论文检验了多家大股东（MLS）对于债务选择的影响。我们在1998 - 2013年期间使用了654家法国上市公司的样本，我们发现，对银行债务的依赖程度随着MLS的存在和MSL的投票权而增加。这一结果对于内生性问题和几项敏感性测试都具有很强的稳健性。此外，我们发现，当掌握控制的股东和少数股东之间的代理问题更为严重时，MLS对债务选择的影响更为明显。综上所述，我们的研究结果表明，MLS降低了掌握控制权的所有者避免银行监管的动机，从而导致了对银行债务的更多依赖。

The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in the Choice of Debt Source

Sabri Boubaker (Champagne School of Management (Groupe ESC Troyes)), Wael Rouatbi (Montpellier Business School - Montpellier Research in Management in Montpellier, France.), Walid Saffar (School of Accounting and Finance at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong)

ABSTRACT：This paper examines the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on debt choice. Using a sample of 654 French-listed firms over the period 1998-2013, we find that reliance on bank debt increases with the presence and voting power of MLS. This result is robust to endogeneity concerns and to several sensitivity tests. Moreover, we find that the effect of MLS on debt choice is more pronounced when agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders are more severe. Taken together, our results suggest that MLS reduce the controlling owner's incentive to avoid bank monitoring, leading to greater reliance on bank debt.

原文链接：

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fima.12148/epdf

翻译：孙雨琦