Journal of Corporate Finance · Volume 45, August 2017, Pages 104–121

周末工作：分析师是否有策略性地发布评级修订版报告？

作者：Lynn Rees (Texas A&M University), Nathan Y. Sharp (Texas A&M University), Paul A. Wong (University of California, Davis)

摘要：我们研究了金融分析师是否有策略地按照与维持管理层关系的激励措施发布其评级修订版报告。我们提供证据表明，周末，投资者和媒体对评级修订的关注减少，分析师可以利用这一点来战略性地发布其修订报告。我们发现，周末发布的降级报告比例高于周间，并且具有最强烈意图维持管理层青睐的分析师更大可能选择在周末发布降级报告。相比之下，缺乏这些特征的分析师更有可能在周间发布降级报告，这与分析师主要受到其他激励的驱动（如及时发布其评级和引起媒体关注）相一致。我们还提出证据表明，降级报告的战略披露与更多的管理访问公众利益的电话会议有关。

关键词：金融分析师；股票评级；战略时机；管理访问

Working on the weekend: Do analysts strategically time the release of their recommendation revisions?

Lynn Rees (Texas A&M University), Nathan Y. Sharp (Texas A&M University), Paul A. Wong (University of California, Davis)

ABSTRACT

We examine whether financial analysts strategically time the announcement of their recommendation revisions consistent with their incentives to maintain relations with management. We provide evidence that investor and media attention to recommendation revisions is reduced on weekends, which analysts can exploit to strategically time the release of their revisions. We find that downgrades are a higher proportion of weekend revisions than weekday revisions and that analysts with characteristics that suggest they possess the strongest incentives to maintain favor with management are more likely to downgrade on the weekend. In contrast, analysts absent these characteristics are more likely to release downgrades during the week, consistent with these analysts being driven primarily by other incentives, such as the timely release of their recommendation and garnering media attention. We also present evidence suggesting that strategic disclosure of recommendation downgrades is associated with greater access to management on public earnings conference calls.

Keywords: Financial analysts; Stock recommendations; Strategic timing; Management access

原文链接：

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119917301955

翻译：熊进宗