Journal of Banking & Finance · Vol.65,APRIL2016

机构持股与公司现金股利政策：来自中国的证据

作者：Michael Firth (Lingnan University), Jin Gao (Lingnan University), Jianghua Shen (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), Yuanyuan Zhang (Lingnan University; Advisory Services, Ernst & Young LLP)

摘要：代理理论认为外部股东喜欢更高的股利支出，由此可以减少由内部人控制的企业的自由现金流。本文调查了中国在2003-2011年间共同基金（通常是最重要、最有影响力的外部股东）对公司股利支付的影响。我们发现共同基金使公司支付更高的现金股利。结果与退出理论的预测一致。在由国家和地方政府控制的公司以及自由现金流相对较高的公司，共同基金的影响更为明显。我们还发现，当共同基金的投资期限越长，所有者权益越大时，它们的影响越强。其他机构投资者（如银行、保险公司和证券公司）的退出威胁较低，它们对公司的现金股利支付或财务业绩没有影响。

关键词：机构所有权，共同基金，股利政策，退出理论

Institutional stock ownership and firms’ cash dividend policies: Evidence from China

Michael Firth (Lingnan University), Jin Gao (Lingnan University), Jianghua Shen (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), Yuanyuan Zhang (Lingnan University; Advisory Services, Ernst & Young LLP)

ABSTRACT

Agency theory suggests that outside shareholders prefer higher dividend payouts in order to reduce the free cash flows of firms that are under the insiders’ control. Our study investigates the effects of mutual funds, typically the most important and influential type of outside shareholder, on firms’ dividend payouts in China during the period from 2003 to 2011. We find that mutual funds influence firms to pay higher cash dividends. The results are consistent with the predictions from exit theory. The effects are more pronounced in firms controlled by state and regional governments and in firms with relatively higher free cash flows. We also find evidence that the mutual funds’ effects are stronger when their investment horizon is longer and the ownership interest is larger. Other institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and securities companies have a lower exit threat and do not have an influence on firms’ cash dividend payments or financial performances.

Keywords: Institutional ownership, Mutual funds, Dividend policy, Exit theory

原文链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426616000194

翻译：贾梦悦