THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE ·Volume 40, Oct 2016, Pages 1-23

高管任期、内部治理和股票市场流动性

作者：Pawan Jain (College of Business, University of Wyoming, Laramie), Christine Jiang (Fogelman College of Business and Economics, The University of Memphis), Mohamed Mekhaimer (School of Business, Clarkson University)

摘要：本文中，我们研究了内部治理（下属经理可以通过它来有效地监督首席执行官）是否可以提升一个公司的流动性。通过使用首席执行官和他直属下属经理的任期之差来衡量内部治理，我们发现有着更好内部治理的公司会有较低的信息不对称性和更高的流动性。进一步，我们发现内部治理在临近首席执行官退休的公司、要求更高专业技能的公司和有着经验丰富下属经理的公司可以更加有效地增加公司流动性。我们得到的结论对于通用的公司治理的衡量方式、其他模型的设定方式以及其他衡量内部治理与流动性的方式都是稳健的。

Executives' horizon, internal governance and stock market liquidity

Pawan Jain (College of Business, University of Wyoming, Laramie), Christine Jiang (Fogelman College of Business and Economics, The University of Memphis), Mohamed Mekhaimer (School of Business, Clarkson University)

ABSTRACT

In this article, we examine whether internal governance, the process through which subordinate managers effectively monitor the chief executive officer (CEO), can improve a firm's liquidity. Using the difference in horizons between a CEO and his immediate subordinates to measure internal governance, we show that firms with better internal governance have lower information asymmetry and higher liquidity. Further, we show that internal governance is effective in enhancing liquidity for firms with CEOs close to retirement, firms that require higher firmspecific skills, and firms with experienced subordinate managers. Our results are robust to inclusion of conventional governance measures, alternative model specifications, and different measures of internal governance and liquidity

Keywords: Executives' horizon、Internal governance、Corporate governance、Subordinate managers、Liquidity

原文链接：http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0929119916300712/1-s2.0-S0929119916300712-main.pdf?_tid=44ad600c-780f-11e6-806d-00000aab0f02&acdnat=1473591945_dbeb3f48b8be7c7194272c81f7abfa5e

翻译：田佳琪