Journal of Corporate Finance · Volume 44, June 2017, Pages 34–47

为什么IPO发行人保证承销商的超额配售选择权？

作者：Yawen Jiao (University of California), Kenji Kutsuna (Kobe University), Richard Smith (University of California)

摘要：以前的研究表明超额配售选择权（OAO）的条款反映了承销商对IPO公司的剥削，但与之相反，我们提供证据表明IPO发行人多方面地受益于此。我们估计，OAO的条款可以带来总发行成本降低、IPO后业绩下降幅度减少、IPO后波动幅度下降、更大的IPO规模。OAO条款更可能使大型公司进行相对较大的IPO规模，特别是在大部分股份由出售股东提供的情况下。我们的证据也表明，除非行使OAO看涨期权，否则管理者和其他内部人士可能会因股权被锁定而受益。

Why do IPO issuers grant overallotment options to underwriters?

Y Yawen Jiao (University of California), Kenji Kutsuna (Kobe University), Richard Smith (University of California)

ABSTRACT

In contrast to prior studies suggesting that overallotment option (OAO) provisions reflect underwriters' exploitation of IPO firms, we provide evidence that issuers benefit in several ways. We estimate that OAO provisions lead to lower total issue cost, less negative post-IPO performance, lower post-IPO volatility, and larger IPOs. OAO provisions are more likely for large firms undertaking relatively large IPOs, especially where a large portion of the shares are offered by selling shareholders. Our evidence also indicates that managers and other insiders may benefit if their shareholdings would be locked up unless the OAO call option feature was exercised.

原文链接：

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119917301293

翻译：陈然